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Abstract 
 
In this study, by manipulating perceptual load, we investigated whether socially anxious 
people process task-irrelevant, non-emotional, natural scenes. When attention was 
directed to letters and perceptual load was low, task-irrelevant natural scenes were 
processed, as evidenced by repetition priming effects, in both high and low socially 
anxious people. In the high perceptual load condition, repetition-priming effects 
decreased in participants with low social anxiety, but not in those with high social 
anxiety. The results were the same when attention was directed to pictures of animals: 
even in the high perceptual load condition, high socially anxious participants processed 
task-irrelevant natural scenes, as evidenced by flanker effects. However, when attention 
was directed to pictures of people, task-irrelevant natural scenes were not processed by 
participants in either anxiety group, regardless of perceptual load. These results suggest 
that high socially anxious individuals could not inhibit task-irrelevant natural scenes 
under conditions of high perceptual load, except when attention was focused on people. 
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Processing of Task-Irrelevant Natural Scenes in Social Anxiety 
 
1. Introduction 
People focus on goal-relevant information by top-down processing, which controls 
where, how, and to what people pay attention. However, task-irrelevant stimuli are not 
always effectively ignored. In some cases, task-irrelevant distractors interfere with 
goal-directed attention, and are unintentionally processed (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; 
Gatti & Egeth, 1978). Interference from task-irrelevant distractors is influenced by 
attentional control (Forster & Lavie, 2007). Individuals with poor attentional control 
experience greater distractor interference than those with good attentional control. 
Considering individual differences in attentional control is an important step in 
revealing the nature of interference effects from task-irrelevant distractors. 
Anxiety is clearly related to poor attentional control (Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, 
& Calvo, 2007; Moriya & Tanno, 2008). According to the attentional control theory 
proposed by Eysenck et al. (2007), anxiety increases the influence of bottom-up 
processing and decreases that of top-down processing on automatic detection and 
processing of task-irrelevant stimuli (see Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009 for a recent 
review). Highly anxious people cannot suppress salient task-irrelevant stimuli. Eysenck 
et al. proposed that attentional control in people with high anxiety is impaired when task 
demands on processing resources are high. While many previous studies revealed 
impaired attentional control in anxious individuals, few studies have investigated the 
processing of task-irrelevant stimulus or manipulated task demands on processing 
resources. 
The perceptual load theory proposed by Lavie (1995, 2005, 2010) is useful for 
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investigating the processing of task-irrelevant stimuli and the effects of task demands. 
When task-relevant stimuli are presented with other task-irrelevant distractors, people 
remain focused on the perception of the task-relevant stimuli. However, people are 
distracted by task-irrelevant stimuli in certain cases, for example when there are few 
task-relevant stimuli or the task-irrelevant distractors are salient. In contrast, when there 
are many task-relevant stimuli or the task-irrelevant distractors are not so salient, people 
are not distracted by the task-irrelevant stimuli. According to the perceptual load theory, 
people have limited resources and all stimuli are automatically processed until 
attentional resources are depleted. When task demands are low, such as a condition with 
a few task-relevant stimuli, there are spare attentional resources and people use them to 
process task-irrelevant stimuli. However, when task demands are high (e.g. many 
task-relevant stimuli must be processed), there is no spare capacity for processing 
task-irrelevant stimuli. In this case, perceptual load is defined as the number of 
task-relevant stimuli or different-identity items (Lavie, 1995, 2005; Lavie & De Fockert, 
2003). Extra attentional resources are allocated to task-irrelevant distractors when just 
one or very few relevant stimuli are presented (low perceptual load). On the other hand, 
attentional resources are exhausted as the number of task-relevant stimuli or 
different-identity items increases (high perceptual load). Therefore, processing 
task-irrelevant distractors weakens under conditions of high perceptual load. 
The perceptual load theory proposes that a high perceptual load diminishes 
perception of task-irrelevant stimuli. However, according to the attentional control 
theory (Eysenck et al., 2007), interference from task-irrelevant distractors in anxious 
individuals might be observed when there is increased demand on processing resources 
because attentional control is impaired. In other words, impaired attentional control and 
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enhanced sensitivity due to anxiety might increase interference from task-irrelevant 
distractors under conditions of high perceptual load. Considering the limited attentional 
resources, interference from task-irrelevant stimuli in anxious people might occur at the 
cost of target perception. When task demands are high, such people might have 
difficulty controlling their attention and may not be able to allocate sufficient attentional 
resources to the target. Instead, they might deploy the remaining resources to the 
task-irrelevant stimuli. 
A few previous studies have investigated the effect of anxiety on processing of 
task-irrelevant stimuli by manipulating perceptual load (Bishop, 2009; Bishop, Jenkins, 
& Lawrence, 2007; Moriya & Tanno, 2010; Sadeh & Bredemeier, 2011). Moriya and 
Tanno (2010) investigated the processing of non-emotional task-irrelevant letters by 
manipulating perceptual load using an adapted flanker task (Lavie & Cox, 1997). 
Participants provided speeded choice responses to a target letter presented at the center 
of the screen while attempting to ignore a distractor letter presented in the periphery. 
Perceptual load was manipulated by varying the number of different-identity letters 
presented in the center. The identity of the peripheral task-irrelevant distractors could be 
either compatible with the target (i.e., the same as the target) or incompatible (i.e., an 
alternative target). When participants processed task-irrelevant distractors, the reaction 
times (RTs) in the incompatible condition were longer than those in the compatible 
condition (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). Moriya and Tanno (2010) showed that, in the low 
perceptual load condition, all participants processed the task-irrelevant stimuli, and RTs 
in the incompatible condition were longer than in the compatible condition. Moreover, 
even in a high perceptual load condition, participants with high social anxiety processed 
the task-irrelevant stimuli. These results suggest that attentional resources are allocated 
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to task-irrelevant distractors in people with high anxiety even when perceptual load is 
high. 
Bishop et al. (2007) designed an fMRI task in which a letter was superimposed on 
task-irrelevant fearful or neutral facial expressions. They manipulated perceptual load 
by varying the number of task-relevant letters. The behavioral results revealed that 
task-irrelevant faces interfered with the performance of high-anxiety participants under 
high perceptual load; in other words, the highly anxious participants had longer RTs and 
made more errors than the low socially anxious participants in the high perceptual load 
condition (for different results in neurological data, see the General Discussion section). 
This suggests that anxious participants allocate attentional resources to task-irrelevant 
facial expressions even under conditions of high perceptual load. 
Previous studies have investigated the effect of task-irrelevant stimuli in anxious 
people by using letters or faces as distractors. Considering that highly anxious people 
routinely process task-irrelevant stimuli, one can reasonably assume that they will also 
process task-irrelevant natural scenes, which are ecologically valid stimuli. Moreover, 
the feature integration theory (Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989) 
posits that stimulus features such as lines, colors, and orientation are processed early, 
automatically, and in parallel. Processing complex natural scenes, which include many 
features, might require more attention than processing letters. It is unclear whether 
anxious people process complicated, task-irrelevant, non-emotional natural scenes in 
both low and high perceptual load conditions.  
This study investigates whether socially anxious people process task-irrelevant 
natural scenes under conditions of high perceptual load. We focus on social anxiety 
because previous research has shown that social anxiety is more strongly related to 
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impaired attentional control than other types of anxiety or depression (Moriya & Tanno, 
2008). Therefore, in this study, we seek to examine whether people with poor attentional 
control suppress task-irrelevant distractors.  
Eysenck et al. propose that processing task-irrelevant stimuli in individuals with 
high social anxiety might be observed when task demands on processing resources are 
high. Therefore, we hypothesize that interference from task-irrelevant stimuli would be 
observed when high socially anxious people categorized stimuli in a high perceptual 
load condition. We also hypothesize that both high and low socially anxious people 
would categorize task-irrelevant natural scenes in the low perceptual load condition. 
2. Experiment 1 
In Experiment 1, we investigated whether socially anxious individuals processed 
task-irrelevant natural scenes when their attention was directed to non-natural scenes 
(i.e., letters). To this end, we used a repetition priming task and manipulated perceptual 
load according to Lavie, Lin, Zokaei, and Thoma (2009). In this task, stimuli are 
presented in an initial display (i.e., prime display), and stimuli in a subsequent display 
(i.e., probe display) are either repeated or non-repeated stimuli (intermixed). The 
repeated stimuli in the probe display are processed more rapidly than the non-repeated 
stimuli, a phenomenon known as repetition priming (Forster & Davis, 1984). Processing 
the stimulus in the prime display enhances target categorization in the probe display, 
even if the stimulus in the prime display is a task-irrelevant distractor. In other words, 
whether task-irrelevant natural scenes in the prime display are categorized is measured 
by facilitation priming in categorizing the natural scene in the probe display. 
As described in the perceptual load theory (Lavie, 2005), the extra attentional 
resources in the low perceptual load condition should lead to repetition priming for the 
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task-irrelevant natural scenes in both high and low socially anxious participants; that is, 
we hypothesized that RTs to repeated stimuli (i.e., primed condition) would be shorter 
than those to non-repeated stimuli (i.e., unprimed condition). In addition, the attentional 
control theory (Eysenck et al., 2007) predicts that high socially anxious people will still 
be unable to inhibit processing of task-irrelevant distractors in the high perceptual load 
condition due to their impaired attentional control. Therefore, we hypothesized that in 
the high perceptual load condition, repetition priming will be observed in highly 
socially anxious people, whereas repetition priming will be reduced or not observed in 
low socially anxious people. 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
The participants were 43 undergraduate students aged 18 to 21 (22 males and 21 
females) who provided informed consent. All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
Participants completed the Japanese version of the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983; Sasagawa et al., 2004), which assesses apprehension related 
to others’ negative evaluations and reflects the degree of social anxiety. The scale 
consists of 12 items rated on 5-point Likert scales. A previous study indicated that the 
average scale score in university students is 43.8 (Moriya & Tanno, 2008). Participants 
were divided into high and low social anxiety groups based on a median split of BFNE 
scores. The 20 participants who scored 42 and above were placed in the high social 
anxiety group; the 20 participants who scored 40 and below were placed in the low 
social anxiety group; the remaining 3 participants who scored the median value of 41 
were excluded. All participants also completed the Japanese versions of the State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Shimizu & Imae, 1981; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 
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1970) and the Self-Rating Depression Scale (SDS; Fukuda & Kobayashi, 1973; Zung, 
1965) used to measure the degree of state, trait anxiety, and depression. 
2.1.2. Materials and apparatus 
All stimuli were presented in white on a black background. In the prime display, 
target and non-target letters were presented on an imaginary circle (with a radius of 
2.52°) at fixation. A target letter (X or N) appeared randomly, but with equal probability, 
in one of six positions. The other five positions were occupied by five O’s in the low 
perceptual load condition and by five different letters (G, H, J, S, and Y) in the high 
perceptual load condition. The five non-target letters could appear randomly in any of 
the six positions with equal probability. The target and non-target letters were 0.57° in 
width and 0.86° in height. 
In addition, a task-irrelevant natural scene, which participants were instructed to 
ignore, was presented on the left or right of the letters in the prime display. The natural 
scenes comprised 24 pictures of animals, 24 pictures of objects, and 24 pictures of 
landscapes selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2005)1. The pictures were relatively neutral. The distance between 
fixation and the task-irrelevant distractor (animal, object, or landscape picture) was 
9.45° from center to center, and the distractor was located to the left or right of fixation 
with equal probability. The task-irrelevant distractor was 6.45° in width and 4.84° in 
height.  
In the probe display, a single picture was presented at the center of the screen. The 
picture showed either an animal or an object; the landscape pictures were not used. The 
picture in the probe display was identical in size to the task-irrelevant distractor in the 
prime display. 
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In the primed condition (one-third of trials), the picture in the probe display was 
identical to the distractor picture presented in the prime display. In the unprimed-related 
condition (one-third of trials), the picture in the probe display differed from the 
distractor picture presented in the prime display and was selected from the alternative 
target category (e.g., if the distractor in the prime display was an animal, the target in 
the probe display would be an object). In the unprimed-neutral condition (one-third of 
trials), irrespective of the picture in the probe display, the picture in the prime display 
was a landscape which was unrelated to the two response options in the probe display. 
We randomly paired the prime and probe display stimuli so that pairs were presented 
with equal frequency in the unprimed-related and -neutral conditions. 
All stimuli were presented on an EPSON Endeavor MT7500 computer with a 
17-inch SONY CPD-E230 screen. Experiments were programmed in Matlab using 
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Participants were seated 
approximately 60 cm from the monitor. RTs and accuracy were obtained from keyboard 
responses. 
2.1.3. Procedure 
Figure 1 presents an example of an experimental trial. The participants were seated 
in front of the monitor in a dark room. A fixation cross appeared at the center of the 
screen for 800 to 1200 ms and participants were required to fixate on the cross. 
Following fixation, the prime display was presented for 200 ms. Participants were 
instructed to ignore the distractor picture and indicate by pressing the appropriate key 
whether the display contained an “X” or an “N”. A blank screen was presented until the 
participants responded. After their response, a fixation cross appeared at the center of 
the screen for 300 to 600 ms and the participants were required to fixate on the cross. 
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Then the probe display was presented for 200 ms. The participants were instructed to 
identify whether the picture was of an animal or an object by pressing the appropriate 
key. A blank screen was presented until the participants responded. The prime and probe 
displays were presented sequentially, and the intertrial interval lasted for 500 ms. 
(Figure 1 about here) 
After 24 practice trials for each load condition, the participants completed 288 
experimental trials per load condition. The blocks in the load conditions were arranged 
in random order for each participant. The primed, unprimed-related, and 
unprimed-neutral conditions were randomized within each load block. The participants 
were instructed to focus on the centrally located fixation cross throughout the task and 
to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. At the end of the task, the 
participants were required to complete the scales. 
2.2. Results 
We analyzed data for each participant and excluded incorrect responses and trials 
where RTs were more than three standard deviations from the mean for each perceptual 
load and priming condition. The average percentage of outliers in the high social 
anxiety group was 1.4% (SD = 0.78) in the prime display and 2.7% (SD = 1.8) in the 
probe display, and the average percentage of outliers in the low social anxiety group 
was 1.8% (SD = 0.75) in the former and 1.9% (SD = 1.2) in the latter. 
2.2.1. Scores on each scale 
The high and low social anxiety groups differed significantly in terms of social 
anxiety (M = 47.2, SD = 4.6 vs. M = 36.7, SD = 3.4; t(38) = 8.27; p < .001, d = 2.61), 
trait anxiety (M = 51.1, SD = 11.1 vs. M = 41.8, SD = 9.0; t(38) = 2.92; p < .01, d = 
0.92), and depression (M = 45.4, SD = 8.0 vs. M = 39.6, SD = 6.9; t(38) = 2.48; p < .05, 
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d = 0.79), but not in state anxiety (M = 40.5, SD = 8.0 vs. M = 38.0, SD = 8.1; t (38) = 
0.98; ns).  
2.2.2. Letter identification task in the prime display 
We confirmed the effects of perceptual load by analyzing RTs in the prime display. 
Mean RTs for the high and low social anxiety groups are presented in Table 1. A 2 
(social anxiety: high and low) × 2 (perceptual load: high and low) ANOVA on RTs 
revealed significant main effects of social anxiety, F(1, 38) = 5.64, p < .05, η2p = .13, 
and perceptual load, F(1, 38) = 224.02, p < .001, η2p = 86, such that RTs in the high 
perceptual load condition were longer than those in the low perceptual load condition 
(high perceptual load: M = 725 ms, SD = 20; low perceptual load: M = 510 ms, SD = 
10). This confirms the validity of our manipulation of perceptual load. There was also a 
two-way interaction between social anxiety and perceptual load, F(1, 38) = 6.65, p < .05, 
η2p = .15. A Bonferroni-corrected simple effects test (two-tailed) revealed that, in the 
high perceptual load condition, RTs for the high social anxiety group were longer than 
those for the low social anxiety group, t(19) = 2.60, p < .05, d = 0.82. However, RTs did 
not differ between high and low social anxiety groups in the low perceptual load 
condition. In addition, in both high and low social anxiety groups, RTs in the high 
perceptual load condition were longer than those in the low perceptual load condition 
(high social anxiety: t(19) = 12.41, p < .001, d = 2.37; low social anxiety: t(19) = 8.76, p 
< .001, d = 1.82). 
(Table 1 about here) 
We also analyzed error rates with a 2 (social anxiety) × 2 (perceptual load) 
ANOVA (Table 1). There were no significant main effects or interaction. 
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2.2.3. Picture identification task in the probe display 
We confirmed the effect of repetition priming by analyzing RTs in the probe 
display. Mean RTs in the high and low social anxiety groups are presented in Table 1. A 
2 (social anxiety) × 2 (perceptual load) × 3 (priming: primed, unprimed-related, and 
unprimed-neutral) ANOVA on RTs revealed significant main effects of perceptual load, 
F(1, 38) = 14.33, p < .01, η2p = .27, and priming, F(2, 76) = 70.66, p < .001, η2p = .65. 
There were also significant two-way interactions between social anxiety and priming, 
F(2, 76) = 4.52, p < .05, η2p = .11, and perceptual load and priming, F(2, 76) = 14.13, p 
< .001, η2p = .27, and a significant three-way interaction between social anxiety, 
perceptual load, and priming, F(2, 76) = 3.43, p < .05, η2p = .08. No other main effects 
or interactions were significant. Bonferroni-corrected simple effects tests revealed that, 
in the case of low perceptual load, RTs in the primed condition were shorter than those 
in the unprimed-related and unprimed-neutral conditions for both the high social anxiety 
(unprimed-related condition: t(19) = 6.86, p < .001; unprimed-neutral condition: t(19) = 
6.78, p < .001) and low social anxiety groups (unprimed-related condition: t(19) = 6.38, 
p < .001; unprimed-neutral condition: t(19) = 4.99, p < .001). In the high perceptual 
load condition, RTs in the primed condition were shorter than those in the 
unprimed-related and unprimed-neutral conditions for the high social anxiety group 
(unprimed-related condition: t(19) = 6.43, p < .001; unprimed-neutral condition: t(19) = 
7.11, p < .001) and only shorter than those in the unprimed-neutral condition for the low 
social anxiety group, t(19) = 2.11, p < .05. There were no differences in overall RTs 
between high and low socially anxious people. 
In keeping with previous studies (Lavie et al., 2009), we defined priming effects by 
subtracting RTs in the primed condition from those in the unprimed-related condition, 
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and then we analyzed the correlations between the priming effect and each scale score 
for all participants (Table 2). The results revealed that social anxiety was positively 
correlated with priming effects under conditions of high perceptual load, but not low 
perceptual load. Trait anxiety, state anxiety, and depression were not correlated with 
priming effects. 
(Table 2 about here) 
Because RTs between high and low socially anxious people in the prime display 
differ, the interval between the prime and probe displays might have also been different 
between high and low socially anxious people. In order to investigate the effects of 
different RTs in the prime display on the priming effect, we conducted a 2 (social 
anxiety) × 2 (perceptual load) × 3 (priming) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) on RTs 
in the picture identification task, with the RTs in the letter identification tasks as a 
covariate. The results were generally consistent with those of the ANOVA. There was a 
significant three-way interaction between social anxiety, perceptual load, and priming, 
F(2, 74) = 4.16, p < .05, η2p = .10. A Bonferroni-corrected simple effects test revealed 
that, in the case of low perceptual load, RTs in the primed condition were shorter than 
those in the unprimed-related and unprimed-neutral conditions for both the high social 
anxiety group (ps < .001) and low social anxiety group (ps < .001). In the high social 
anxiety group, RTs in the unprimed-related condition were also shorter than those in the 
unprimed-neutral condition (p < .05). In the high perceptual load condition, RTs in the 
primed condition were shorter than those in the unprimed-related and unprimed-neutral 
conditions for the high social anxiety group (ps < .001), and only shorter than those in 
the unprimed-neutral condition for the low social anxiety group (p < .05). 
We also computed the partial correlation between the priming effect and each scale 
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score controlling for RTs in the prime display. The results were consistent with the 
previously described correlations. In the case of high perceptual load, a significant 
positive correlation was observed between social anxiety and priming effects, r = .34, p 
< .05, but this correlation was not observed in the case of low perceptual load, r = –.07, 
n.s. Trait anxiety, state anxiety, and depression were not correlated with priming effects. 
We also analyzed error rates with a 2 (social anxiety) × 2 (perceptual load) × 3 
(priming) ANOVA (Table 1). There were no significant main effects or interactions. 
2.3. Discussion 
The present experiment revealed repetition priming of task-irrelevant natural 
scenes in the low perceptual load condition, and this priming effect was invariant across 
degrees of social anxiety. In other words, all participants processed the task-irrelevant 
natural scenes in the low perceptual load condition. In contrast, repetition priming in the 
high perceptual load condition was related to social anxiety such that the magnitude of 
this effect increased with increased social anxiety. Individuals with high social anxiety 
could not inhibit processing of task-irrelevant distractors and processed distractors even 
in the high perceptual load condition. The distractor priming effect increased in 
proportion to the degree of social anxiety, but not in proportion to trait anxiety, state 
anxiety, or depression. These results support the hypothesis that interference from 
task-irrelevant distractors would be observed under conditions where increased demand 
was placed on processing resources, while interference was invariant under conditions 
of low demand; further, these results are consistent with Eysenck et al. (2007). 
Repetition priming effects from the task-irrelevant distractors were observed even 
in the high perceptual load condition, regardless of the degree of social anxiety, which is 
inconsistent with the results of previous studies (Lavie, 1995; Lavie & De Fockert, 
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2003). We assume that there are two causes for the difference between the results of our 
study and those of previous ones. First, the size of the distractors in this study was larger 
than in previous studies and might have been processed more easily, thereby requiring 
less attention. Second, natural scenes require fewer attentional resources for processing 
than simple letters and colors (Fei-Fei, VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2005; Li, 
VanRullen, Koch, & Perona, 2002; Otsuka & Kawaguchi, 2007). In previous studies, 
participants were required to determine whether five randomly rotated letters presented 
at the center of the display were the same while also detecting a peripheral target (i.e., 
rotated letter, vertically bisected disk, or natural scene). These studies showed that 
performance detecting and categorizing natural scenes was better than performance 
discriminating letters or color patterns. In fact, Lavie et al. (2009) found that priming 
effects in a high perceptual load condition were reduced, but not eliminated, when the 
task-irrelevant distractors were natural scenes. Therefore, it may be difficult to prevent 
processing of task-irrelevant natural scenes. 
3. Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 revealed that participants with high social anxiety could not inhibit 
processing of task-irrelevant natural scenes and they processed those natural scenes 
while directing attention to letters, even in the high perceptual load condition. However, 
it is still unclear whether high socially anxious people would process task-irrelevant 
natural scenes when they are directing attention to other natural scenes. Because people 
attend to environmental stimuli more than letters in everyday life, investigating 
distractor processing when attention is directed to natural scenes is more ecologically 
valid. In Experiment 2, we used natural scenes as both the target and task-irrelevant 
stimuli to investigate the effect of social anxiety on processing task-irrelevant natural 
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scenes when attention was directed to other natural scenes. We manipulated perceptual 
load by varying the number of different-identity non-target pictures. 
In this experiment, we replaced the pictures of objects with pictures of people. 
Socially anxious people are afraid of social situations, such as talking in front of people 
and being evaluated by others (Clark & Wells, 1995; Miers, Blöte, Bokhorst, & 
Westenberg, 2009; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997; Voncken & Bögels, 2008; Voncken, Dijk, 
de Jong, & Roelofs, 2010). Considering these features of social anxiety, investigating 
how pictures of people are processed is important. 
We modified the flanker task used in Experiment 1 by replacing the letter stimuli 
with pictures in the prime display, and measured flanker compatibility effects (Eriksen 
& Eriksen, 1974). When participants responded to a central target letter flanked by the 
same task-irrelevant letters, they identified the target rapidly. However, when the target 
was flanked by different task-irrelevant letters, these task-irrelevant stimuli interfere 
with target processing and lead to increase in RTs. This is called the flanker 
compatibility effect. This effect also occurs with natural stimuli (Wells & Hamm, 2009). 
In Experiment 2, the identity of the peripheral task-irrelevant pictures could be 
compatible with the target (i.e., same category as the target), incompatible with the 
target (i.e., the alternative category), or neutral (i.e., neither of the possible target 
categories). In the incompatible condition, task-irrelevant stimuli should produce 
interference, thereby resulting in longer RTs compared to the compatible condition. 
Based on the results of Experiment 1, we hypothesized that even when directing 
attention to natural scenes, participants with high social anxiety process the 
task-irrelevant natural scenes in the high perceptual load condition, and interference 
effects are observed as flanker compatibility effects. However, participants with low 
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social anxiety might not process the task-irrelevant natural scenes in the high perceptual 
load condition. On the other hand, in the case of the low perceptual load, we 
hypothesized that the task-irrelevant natural scenes are processed by both high and low 
socially anxious people because of the additional, unused attentional resources. 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
The participants were 53 undergraduate students aged 18 to 21 (25 males and 28 
females) who provided written informed consent. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. Participants completed the BFNE and were divided into 
high and low social anxiety groups based on a median split of BFNE scores. The 26 
participants who scored 42 and above were placed in the high social anxiety group, and 
the other 25 participants who scored 40 and below were placed in the low social anxiety 
group. The two participants who scored the median value of 41 were excluded. All 
participants also completed the STAI and SDS. 
3.1.2. Materials 
A target and three non-target pictures were presented around a fixation cross. A 
target picture (animal or person) appeared randomly but with equal probability in one of 
four positions. The other three non-target positions were occupied by three pictures of 
the same vehicle in the low perceptual load condition, or by three pictures of different 
vehicles in the high perceptual load condition. The distance between fixation and the 
task-relevant stimuli was 4.00° from center to center. The task-irrelevant distractor 
(picture of an animal, person, or landscape) was located to the left or right of the 
fixation with equal probability. The distance between fixation and the task-irrelevant 
distractor was 9.45° from center to center. The target, non-target, and task-irrelevant 
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pictures were 6.45° in width × 4.84° in height. The target natural scenes were 12 
pictures of animals and 12 pictures of people, and the non-target natural scenes were 3 
pictures of vehicles. The task-irrelevant natural scenes were 12 pictures of animals, 12 
pictures of people (these were the same as the target pictures), and 12 pictures of 
landscapes. All pictures were selected from the IAPS2. 
In the compatible condition (one-third of trials), the distractor picture was from the 
same category as the target; however, it was not the same picture. In the neutral 
condition (one-third of trials), the distractor had no response association (i.e., the 
distractor was a landscape picture). In the incompatible condition (one-third of trials), 
the distractor was from the alternative target category. 
3.1.3. Procedure 
Figure 2 presents an example of an experimental trial. A fixation cross appeared at 
the center of the screen for 800 to 1200 ms and the participants were required to fixate 
on the cross. Following fixation, the target, non-target, and task-irrelevant pictures were 
presented for 200 ms. The participants were instructed to ignore the task-irrelevant 
picture and indicate by pressing the appropriate key whether the target picture showed a 
person or an animal. A blank screen was presented until a response was made. The 
inter-trial interval was 500 ms. 
After 24 practice trials for each load condition, the participants completed 144 
experimental trials per load condition. The blocks in the load conditions were arranged 
in random order for each participant. The participants were instructed to focus on the 
centrally located fixation cross throughout the task and to respond as quickly and 
accurately as possible. At the end of the task, the participants were required to complete 
the scales. 
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3.2. Results 
We analyzed data for each participant and removed incorrect responses and trials 
where RTs were more than three standard deviations from the mean. The average 
percentage of outliers was 1.71% (SD = 0.79) in the high social anxiety group and 
2.04% (SD = 0.96) in the low social anxiety group. 
3.2.1. Scores on each scale 
The high and low social anxiety groups differed significantly in terms of social 
anxiety (M = 49.3, SD = 4.7, vs. M = 33.2, SD = 5.8, t(49) = 10.88, p < .001, d = 3.05), 
trait anxiety (M = 52.3, SD = 10.2, vs. M = 41.8, SD = 8.3, t(49) = 3.98, p < .001, d = 
1.13), state anxiety (M = 44.5, SD = 10.7, vs. M = 37.6, SD = 6.1, t(49) = 2.82, p < .01, 
d = 0.79), and depression (M = 45.5, SD = 7.1, vs. M = 39.8, SD = 5.8, t(49) = 3.09, p 
< .01, d = 0.94).  
3.2.2. Animal target condition 
We analyzed RTs separately for each target category (i.e., animal and person) 
because RTs varied between categories (Table 3). In the animal target condition, a 2 
(social anxiety) × 2 (perceptual load) × 3 (compatibility: compatible, neutral, and 
incompatible) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of perceptual load, F(1, 49) = 
33.56, p < .001, η2p = .41, and compatibility, F(2, 98) = 16.04, p < .001, η2p = .25. There 
was a significant two-way interaction between perceptual load and compatibility, F(2, 
98) = 4.04, p < .05, η2p = .08. There was also a significant three-way interaction 
between social anxiety, perceptual load, and compatibility, F(2, 98) = 3.37, p < .05, η2p 
= .06. No other main effects or interactions were significant. A Bonferroni-corrected 
simple effects test revealed that, in the case of low perceptual load, RTs in the 
incompatible condition were longer than those in the compatible and neutral conditions 
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for both the high social anxiety (compatible condition: t(25) = 2.75, p < .05; neutral 
condition: t(25) = 2.77, p < .05) and low social anxiety groups (compatible condition: 
t(24) = 4.15, p < .001; neutral condition: t(24) = 5.12, p < .001). However, in the case of 
high perceptual load, RTs in the incompatible condition were longer than those in the 
compatible condition for the high social anxiety group only, t(25) = 3.59, p < .01. 
Because interference from task-irrelevant natural scenes was observed, we defined 
flanker compatibility effects by subtracting RTs in the compatible condition from those 
in the incompatible condition for animal targets, and analyzed the correlations between 
the compatibility effect and each scale score for all participants (Table 4). The results 
indicated that social anxiety was positively correlated with flanker compatibility effects 
under conditions of high perceptual load, but not under conditions of low perceptual 
load. Trait anxiety was also marginally correlated with compatibility effects in the high 
perceptual load condition. There were no correlations between the other scale scores 
and compatibility effects. 
(Table 4 about here) 
Error rates were also analyzed with a 2 (social anxiety) × 2 (perceptual load) × 3 
(compatibility) ANOVA (Table 3). There was a marginally significant main effect of 
perceptual load, F(1, 49) = 3.16, p = .082, η2p = .06, and a significant two-way 
interaction between social anxiety and compatibility, F(2, 98) = 5.08, p < .01, η2p = .09. 
Follow-up t-tests for simple effects revealed that low socially anxious people made 
more errors in the neutral condition than the compatible condition, t(24) = 2.71, p < .05. 
No other main effects or interactions were significant. Error rates in the high perceptual 
load condition were higher than those in the low perceptual load condition, thereby 
demonstrating that perceptual load was successfully manipulated. 
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3.2.3. Person target condition 
In the person target condition, a 2 (social anxiety) × 2 (perceptual load) × 3 
(compatibility) ANOVA on RTs revealed a significant main effect of perceptual load, 
F(1, 49) = 16.04, p < .001, η2p = .25. RTs in the high perceptual load condition were 
longer than those in the low perceptual load condition. No other main effects or 
interactions were significant. Further, no interference effects were observed regardless 
of perceptual load condition. 
(Table 3 about here) 
Error rates were also analyzed with a 2 (social anxiety) × 2 (perceptual load) × 3 
(compatibility) ANOVA (Table 3). The three-way ANOVA on error rates revealed a 
significant main effect of perceptual load, F(1, 49) = 7.25, p < .05, η2p = .13. There was 
also a significant two-way interaction between social anxiety and compatibility, F(2, 98) 
= 3.09, p < .05, η2p = .06. However, the follow-up t-tests for simple effects showed no 
significant effects. No other main effects or interactions were significant. Error rates in 
the high perceptual load condition were higher than those in the low perceptual load 
condition, thereby demonstrating that perceptual load was successfully manipulated. 
3.3. Discussion 
The present experiment revealed that task-irrelevant natural scenes produced 
interference in high and low socially anxious people when attention was directed to 
animal pictures and perceptual load was low. However, in the case of high perceptual 
load interference was not observed in low socially anxious people but was observed in 
high socially anxious people. Furthermore, the magnitude of interference increased with 
increases in the degree of social anxiety. High socially anxious people could not inhibit 
processing of task-irrelevant distractors and processed the distractors even in the high 
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perceptual load condition. These results support the hypothesis that interference from 
task-irrelevant natural scenes would be observed under conditions where there was a 
greater demand on processing resources, while these effects were invariant under 
conditions of low processing demand. In contrast, when directing attention to pictures of 
people, task-irrelevant natural scenes did not produce interference, regardless of 
perceptual load and degree of social anxiety; all participants inhibited processing of the 
task-irrelevant distractors. 
When directing attention to animal pictures, interference from the task-irrelevant 
neutral scenes was observed. Specifically, RTs in the incompatible condition were 
longer than those in other conditions. Considering that in the incompatible condition the 
task-irrelevant natural scenes were pictures of people, processing may have been 
enhanced for these task-irrelevant pictures. Previous studies have shown that 
task-irrelevant faces are processed efficiently regardless of perceptual load (Lavie, Ro, 
& Russel, 2003; Neuman & Schweinberger, 2008). Human bodies also attract attention 
(Ro, Friggel, & Lavie, 2007). Therefore, participants’ attention might be attracted to 
task-irrelevant pictures of people. Because the processing of task-irrelevant stimuli 
depends on attentional control (Forster & Lavie, 2007) and socially anxious people have 
impaired attentional control (Eysenck et al., 2007; Moriya & Tanno, 2008), high 
socially anxious people might process task-irrelevant pictures of people even in the high 
perceptual load condition. 
When directing attention to pictures of people, interference effects from the 
distractors were not observed. Human faces capture attention automatically through the 
stimulus-driven attentional system (Langton, Law, Burton, & Schweinberger, 2008), and 
it is difficult to disengage attention once it has been directed to faces (Bindemann, 
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Burton, Hooge, Jenkins, & de Haan, 2005). Therefore, participants could not process the 
task-irrelevant natural scenes when the target stimulus was a person. In addition, it is 
possible that only one face can be processed at a time (Bindemann, Burton, & Jenkins, 
2005; Bindemann, Jenkins, & Burton, 2007; Neumann & Schweinberger, 2009). 
Although the task-irrelevant natural scene in the compatible condition was from the 
same category as the target, participants may have been unable to process more than one 
picture of people simultaneously. Therefore, enhanced processing of the target in the 
compatible condition was not observed. 
4. General Discussion 
The present study investigated processing of task-irrelevant natural scenes in high 
and low socially anxious people by manipulating perceptual load when attention was 
directed to a target letter (Experiment 1) or natural scene (Experiment 2). When 
attention was directed to letters, increased perceptual load resulted in reduced 
processing of task-irrelevant distractors in low socially anxious people. However, in 
high socially anxious people, increased perceptual load did not reduce processing of 
task-irrelevant natural scenes, and task-irrelevant distractors were processed even in the 
high perceptual load condition. When attention was directed to a natural scene target, 
the processing of task-irrelevant natural scenes depended on the target category. When 
the target was an animal, increased perceptual load prevented low socially anxious 
people from processing the task-irrelevant natural scenes, whereas increased perceptual 
load did not diminish the processing of the task-irrelevant distractor in high socially 
anxious people. However, when the target was a person, task-irrelevant natural scenes 
were not processed by either high or low socially anxious people regardless of 
perceptual load. These results suggest that high socially anxious people were unable to 
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inhibit the task-irrelevant distractors when perceptual load was high and that attention is 
automatically captured by people. While previous studies have demonstrated that high 
socially anxious people process letter or face distractors under conditions of high 
perceptual load when target stimuli are letters (Bishop et al., 2007; Moriya & Tanno, 
2010; Sadeh & Bredemeier, 2011), in this study, we showed that this pattern of 
distractor processing also applies to natural scene distractors when directing attention 
not only to letters but also to animal pictures. This, in turn, supports the hypothesis 
proposed by Eysenck et al. (2007) that interference from task-irrelevant distractors will 
be observed in anxious individuals when there is increased demand on processing 
resources. 
The finding that RTs in high socially anxious people were partially longer than 
those in low socially anxious people (i.e., in the high perceptual load condition in the 
prime display in Experiment 1) is also consistent with the attentional control theory 
(Eysenck et al., 2007, Derakshan & Koster, 2010). Socially anxious people with poor 
attentional control maintain a high performance level (i.e., response accuracy) at the 
cost of reduced processing efficiency (i.e., response latency). In a difficult task, decision 
times for target detection were increased in anxious people in order to increase the 
response accuracy (Derakshan & Koster, 2010). Even if they detected the target once, 
they might compare the target with other non-target stimuli. In Experiment 1, they 
detected the target carefully in high rather than low perceptual load conditions in order 
to maintain the high response accuracy. Therefore, poor attentional control in high 
socially anxious people might lead to long RTs in high perceptual load conditions. 
Attentional control plays an important role in suppressing responses to 
task-irrelevant stimuli (Foster & Lavie, 2007). Increasing processing demands do not 
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reduce distractor processing in high socially anxious people, and this might be because 
of inefficient attentional control (Moriya & Tanno, 2008). In order to increase task 
demands, we only manipulated perceptual load according to Bishop (2009), whereas 
other previous studies manipulated working memory load in addition to perceptual load 
(de Fockert, Rees, Frith, & Lavie, 2001; Lavie, Hirst, de Fockert, & Viding, 2004; Lavie 
& de Fockert, 2005). Although prefrontal attentional control is necessary for coping 
with both perceptual and working memory loads (Bishop, 2009; de Fockert et al., 2001), 
high perceptual and working memory loads do not necessarily have the same effects on 
distractor processing (Lavie, 2005, 2010; Lavie et al., 2004). Future studies should 
investigate whether high perceptual and working memory loads have different effects on 
distractor processing in individuals with social anxiety. 
The results reported here are not necessarily consistent with those of Bishop (2009). 
According to Bishop, neither high- nor low-anxiety individuals process task-irrelevant 
distractors under conditions of high perceptual load, whereas increased interference 
from distractors is observed in high socially anxious individuals under conditions of low 
perceptual load. Bishop used letters as target and distractor stimuli, whereas our study 
used natural scenes as stimuli, which may be more salient than letters. In contrast to 
Bishop (2009), we may have observed evidence that task-irrelevant natural scenes were 
processed because anxious individuals are more sensitive to salient stimuli (Eysenck et 
al., 2007; Moriya & Tanno, 2009). 
The present results are consistent with the behavioral results in Bishop et al. (2007) 
but are not consistent with their neuroimaging results. Bishop et al. (2007) used facial 
expressions (i.e., fearful faces) for task-irrelevant stimuli and enhanced amygdala 
activity was revealed for fearful faces in highly anxious participants in low perceptual 
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load conditions, but not in high perceptual load conditions. Similar differences between 
behavior and imaging results have been indicated in previous studies. For example, 
MacNamara and Hajcak (2009, 2010) showed that task-irrelevant aversive stimuli 
increase error rates and RTs; however, these stimuli did not interfere with neural activity 
measured by ERPs. MacNamara and Hajcak (2009, 2010) suggest that behavioral data 
does not depend on complete awareness of stimulus meaning, whereas neuroimaging 
data is related to elaborated processing of stimulus meaning. In the present study, the 
task-irrelevant stimuli were from very different categories. Therefore, interference may 
have occurred in high socially anxious individuals because of superordinate-level 
category processing (e.g., animal), even if they did not process the identity of the 
task-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., a dog). Therefore, it is possible that interference would not 
be observed in high socially anxious individuals if the task-irrelevant stimuli were from 
similar categories. 
This study provides the first demonstration that high socially anxious individuals 
process task-irrelevant non-emotional natural scenes, and this result is important for 
understanding the mechanisms of attentional control in social anxiety. However, some 
issues require resolution through further study. Using natural scenes as task-irrelevant 
distractors, the present results suggest that socially anxious people process 
task-irrelevant information in social situations, which might lead to poor performance in 
the situations. Poor performance leads to negative evaluations from others and increases 
anxiety. However, when directing attention toward people, task-irrelevant information 
does not interfere with the performance of socially anxious people. Considering that 
socially anxious people are afraid of interaction with people in social situations, it is 
important to focus on processing pictures of people in order to elucidate the 
Processing of Natural Scenes in Social Anxiety 28 
mechanisms underlying social anxiety in social situations. In addition, although the task 
demands on processing resources are important in the attentional control theory, few 
previous studies have investigated the processing of task-irrelevant stimulus in anxiety 
by manipulating task demands. Further studies should promote the development of this 
aspect. 
In conclusion, two experiments examined the processing of task-irrelevant natural 
scenes in social anxiety by manipulating perceptual load. The results suggest that high 
socially anxious people could not inhibit the processing of task-irrelevant natural scenes 
when the perceptual load was high whereas low socially anxious people were able to 
inhibit the processing. However, when directing attention to people, all participants 
inhibited the processing of task-irrelevant distractors regardless of perceptual load. 
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Footnotes 
1 The following are the IAPS picture numbers: animals—1333, 1450, 1463, 1500, 
1510, 1540, 1560, 1590, 1600, 1602, 1603, 1610, 1620, 1640, 1660, 1670, 1675, 1720, 
1721, 1740, 1722, 1810, 1812, 1920; objects—7004, 7006, 7009, 7010, 7025, 7030, 
7031, 7034, 7035, 7038, 7040, 7042, 7043, 7050, 7056, 7057, 7080, 7090, 7150, 7175, 
7190, 7211, 7233, 7235; and landscapes—5000, 5010, 5020, 5030, 5201, 5220, 5250, 
5270, 5593, 5631, 5635, 5660, 5700, 5711, 5720, 5781, 5811, 5814, 5870, 5891, 5900, 
5982, 5990, 5991. The mean valence ratings were 6.80 (SD = 0.64) for animals, 4.98 
(SD = 0.27) for objects, and 6.85 (SD = 0.48) for landscapes. The valence ratings 
differed significantly, F(2, 69) = 116.10, p < .001, η2p = .77, such that ratings for 
animals and landscapes were higher than those for objects. The mean arousal ratings 
were 4.22 (SD = 0.72) for animals, 2.84 (SD = 0.66) for objects, and 3.83 (SD = 0.88) 
for landscapes; these ratings differed significantly, F(2, 69) = 21.67, p < .001, η2p = .39, 
such that arousal ratings for animals and landscapes were higher than those for objects. 
2 The following are the numbers of the IAPS pictures: animals—1333, 1450, 1510, 
1560, 1640, 1660, 1670, 1675, 1720, 1740, 1810, 1812; people—2000, 2025, 2030, 
2240, 2250, 2270, 2442, 2500, 2506, 2513, 2620, 2630; landscapes—5020, 5030, 5220, 
5250, 5593, 5635, 5711, 5720, 5870, 5900, 5990, 5991; and vehicles—7130, 7595, 
8510. The mean valence ratings were 6.35 (SD = 0.52) for animals, 6.21 (SD = 0.35) 
for people, 6.45 (SD = 0.29) for landscapes, and 5.55 (SD = 1.54) for vehicles. The 
valence ratings were marginally different, F(3, 35) = 2.40, p = .084, η2p = .17, such that 
the ratings for vehicles were slightly lower than those for landscape. However, because 
the valence ratings did not differ among animals, people, and landscapes, the 
interference effects might not be related to valence. The mean arousal ratings were 4.24 
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(SD = 0.86) for animals, 3.69 (SD = 0.53) for people, 3.55 (SD = 0.66) for landscapes, 
and 4.01 (SD = 0.82) for vehicles. Arousal ratings did not differ, F(3, 35) = 0.11, ns. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Sequence of the high perceptual load condition in the unrelated condition in 
Experiment 1. 
 
Figure 2. Sequence of the high perceptual load condition in the incompatible condition 





Table 1  
Mean RTs (SE in parentheses) and Percentage of Errors in the Prime and Probe Displays in Experiment 1 
 
Prime Display  Probe Display 
   Low Perceptual Load  High Perceptual Load 












High Social Anxiety           
RT (ms) 526 (14) 778 (31)  502 (16) 538 (13) 546 (13)  531 (14) 560 (14) 563 (14) 
% Error 6 8  7 6 7  6 5 5 
Low Social Anxiety           
RT (ms) 494 (16) 672 (26)  493 (15) 526 (13) 526 (12)  522 (14) 531 (13) 533 (12) 
% Error 5 6  6 4 5  6 6 5 
Table 2 
Correlations between Priming Effects and Each Score in the High and Low Perceptual 
Load in Experiment 1. 
 BFNE STAI-T STAI-S SDS 
High Perceptual Load  .37* .19 –.15  .02 




Note. BFNE: Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale, STAI–T: State Trait Anxiety 
Inventory–Trait Form, STAI–S: State Trait Anxiety Inventory–State Form, SDS: 
Self-Rating Depression Scale 
*p < .05 
Table 3  
Mean RTs (SE in parentheses) and Percentage of Errors in Experiment 2 
 
Low Perceptual Load  High Perceptual Load 
Compatible Neutral Incompatible  Compatible Neutral Incompatible 
Animal Condition        
High Social Anxiety        
RT (ms) 583(16) 579 (16) 598 (16)  630 (19) 636 (19) 650 (19) 
% Error 5 4 3  4 4 7 
Low Social Anxiety        
RT (ms) 613 (14) 601 (13) 636 (17)  653 (18) 645 (16) 653 (19) 
% Error 2 4 5  5 3 5 
Person Condition        
High Social Anxiety        
RT (ms) 573 (16) 566 (16) 565 (15)  604 (18) 619 (22) 599 (16) 
% Error 4 6 3  4 4 6 
Low Social Anxiety        
RT (ms) 591 (14) 591 (13) 589 (13)  612 (15) 616 (15) 609 (15) 
% Error 3 5 5  4 2 5 
 
Table 4 
Correlations between Flanker Compatibility Effects and Each Score in the High and 
Low Perceptual Load in the Animal Target Condition in Experiment 2. 
 BFNE STAI-T STAI-S SDS 
High Perceptual Load   .31*   .26†  .20  .20 





†p = .059, *p < .05 
